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CASE NOTES
Administrative Law-FCC Applies Fairness Doctrine To Cigarette Commercials.-Acting for himself, attorney John Banzhaf III filed a complaint
requesting that WCBS-TV grant free and equal air time to groups opposed to
cigarette smoking because it is a health hazard.' The FCC ruled in favor of the
complaint, holding that cigarette commercials present a "controversial issue of
public importance" and are therefore within the ambit of the fairness doctrine."
The Commission suggested that WCBS-TV comply with the ruling by presenting
public service announcements available from the American Cancer Society or the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. However, the FCC emphasized
that equal time was not required by the fairness doctrine, but that a "significant"
amount of time, to be determined by the licensee, would be sufficient. In re
Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967). The FCC later denied a
petition for stay of effectiveness. 3 The Commission also issued a clarification
notice, stating that licensees were not required to use the suggested spot announcements, nor were they required to grant free rebuttal time to the tobacco
4
industry.
As a licensee of the Government,5 bound to operate in the public interest, a
broadcasting station is expected to keep its audience informed of major public
issues. 7 The Federal Communication Commission's fairness doctrine imposes
upon broadcast licensees who present "controversial issues of public importance"
an affirmative obligation to provide a significant amount of air time to responsible spokesmen for conflicting points of view.8 The broadcaster may not require
payment for the time provided,9 but he has been permitted to retain substantial
discretion in selecting spokesmen for the opposition point of view, 10 allotting
1. Letter from John Banzhaf Ill to FCC, Jan. 5, 1967, on file in Fordham Law Review
Office.
2. Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967).
3.

Television Station WCBS-TV, 36 U.S.L.W. 2170 (F.C.C. Sept. 8, 1967).

4. FCC Doc. 67-1074, 36 U.S.L.W. 2194 (Sept. 21, 1967). The order is being challenged
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1967, at
25, col. 3.
5. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1964). Licenses are granted for three
year periods, with renewal provisions. 48 Stat. 1084 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d)
(1964).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1964).
7. FCC Public Notice 95462 (Mar. 27, 1946).
8. 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1964); Cullman Broadcasting
Co., 25 P & F Radio Reg. 895 (1963); FCC, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the
Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Primer].
9. "[Y]ou cannot reject programming-otherwise suitable to you-solely on the ground
that it is not sponsored, where you have not presented and do not plan to present the
conflicting viewpoints in other programming." John Norris, I F.C.C.2d 541, 542 (1965).
10. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1251-52 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as Report on Editorializing].
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time" and choosing program format.' The doctrine is generally applied to both
national13 and local issues, 14 where an individual has been attacked on the air, 15
and to the broadcast of political spot announcements.'
Broadcast licensees, like other communicators, are protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech.' 7 The first amendment "rests on the assumption
that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public .. ."18 Broadcasting
makes possible the exercise of free speech in a unique fashion, reaching vast
numbers of people simultaneously. However, the physical limitations of the
broadcast band make it impossible to assign individual frequencies to all those
with differing viewpoints on important questions. 19 As licensor of this vital but
limited medium, 20 the Government has a responsibility to assure the maximum
possible dissemination of opposing views. 21 Without censoring the programs
presented by licensees, 22 the FCC has required that the few who are licensed
permit others to voice their opinions over the air.2 3 The Commission demands
that a license applicant or license renewal applicant be prepared to present
balanced programming to the24public, with sufficient time devoted to the discussion of major public issues.
11. Id.
12.

Id.

13. E.g., Capitol Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1135 (1965) (civil rights) ; Cullman Broadcasting Co., 25 P &F Radio Reg. 895 (1963) (nuclear weapons test ban treaty).
14. E.g., Richard B. Wheeler, 6 F.C.C.2d 599 (1965) (credit counseling and debt adjusting); Spartan Radiocasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 765 (1962); Hon. Charles L. Murphy, 23 P & F
Radio Reg. 953 (1962) (hospital conditions); The Evening News Ass'n (WWJ), 6 P & F
Radio Reg. 283 (1950) (labor strikes).
15. Milton Broadcasting Co., 23 P & F Radio Reg. 586 (1962); Billings Broadcasting Co.,
23 P & F Radio Reg. 951 (1962).
16. Lawrence M. C. Smith, 25 P & F Radio Reg. 291 (1963).
17. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
18. Id. at 20.
19. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1964).
21. See Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale For Broadcasting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. Colo. L. Rev. 31, 44 (1964).
22. 48 Stat. 1091 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1964): "Nothing in this chapter
shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship . . . and
no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall
interfere with the right of free speech . . . ." See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381
F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1967, at 31, cols. 2-3 (No. 600,
1967 Term).
23. "It is this right of the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the
Government, any broadcast licensee or any individual member of the public to broadcast his
own particular views on any matter, which is the foundation stone of the American system
of broadcasting." Report on Editorializing at 1249.
24. FCC Public Notice 95462 (Mar. 27, 1946). Although not specifically authorized to do
so by statute, the FCC has always considered program service an important factor In determining whether a station has fulfilled the public interest requirement. See W. Emery, Broadcasting and Government 36-41 (1961). Overall programming control by the FCC has received
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The fairness doctrine becomes operative after a license has been granted. Its
purpose is to prevent infringement of free access to the air waves during the term
of the license.25 If the licensee presents one side of a "controversial issue of public
importance," he is required to seek out, and offer time to, those who represent
conflicting points of view on that issue. 26 Such infringement upon broadcasters'
freedom of speech is considered necessary in order to protect the public's right
to be informed.27 However, the FCC generally does not specify which issues a
broadcaster must present, nor does it control the choice of opposition spokesmen
or the time offered to them. Thus, as long as the licensee does not deprive some
right to speak freely over the air, he retains subresponsible persons of their
28
stantial editorial freedom.
Broadcasters contend that by "suggesting" the presentation of public service
spot announcements, the FCC has departed from fairness doctrine policy, which
in the past has emphasized that programming is a matter for licensee determination.2 Because of the broadcasters' argument that the Commission's departure
bordered on censorship, 30 the FCC specifically clarified its original position by
stating that licensees are free to employ other types of programming, for example,
roundtable discussions or documentaries. 3 1 Despite this clarification, the FCC
has, in effect, prescribed the manner of compliance since the presentation of paid
cigarette commercials requires presentation of opposing advertisements, gratis.
Larger network affiliated stations, which have the facilities and the capital to
broadcast discussions, interviews and documentaries on controversial issues, do
not consider the smoking problem of sufficient audience interest to justify an
increase in the time presently devoted to the cigarette controversy and a reducjudicial recognition. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d
850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). See also National Broadcasting Co.
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
25.

Report on Editorializing at 1248-49 n.1.

26. Fairness Primer at 104 23.
27. Id.

28. Id. at 1024.
29. Report on Editorializing at 1251-52; McIntire v. William Penn Broadcasting Co,
151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 US. 779 (1946). See Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
30. Letter from WCBS-TV to FCC, June 23, 1967, at 1-2, 6, on file in the Fordham Law
Review Office. In asking the FCC to reconsider its decision, Peter Ailport, President of the
National Association of Broadcasters, stated: "'The principle of the inviolability of editorial
content from advertising influence stems from the broader freedom of editors and publishers
from all outside pressure.... The decision on what and what not to publish ...

has been up

to the editor. But the ruling now instructs the broadcast media to use their editorial (noncommercial) time to counter the possible influence of advertisements. The freedom of
editorial decision has thus been violated. In the future editorial content, in part, at least,
will not be dictated by the conscience and responsibility of the licensee, but by special interest
groups acting through the commission.
"'We fear that this may open the floodgates to "editorial pressure" to the detriment of a
free and unbiased press.'" Advertising Age, July 10, 1967, at 3, 56, cols. 4-5, 1-3.
31. FCC Doc. 67-1074, 36 U.S.L.W. 2194 (Sept. 21, 1967).
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tion of the time scheduled for other controversial issues.3 2 Moreover, the standards necessary for compliance with the doctrine are vague,8 3 and broadcasters
are reluctant to experiment with other methods of compliance when they can
safely retain their licenses by following suggestions which would clearly satisfy
the FCC.34 If documentaries are used, should they present solely the health
hazard side of the controversy, or would it be permissible to present the views
of the tobacco industry as well? Would the audience be interested in a one-sided
documentary? The prohibitive cost of producing programs precludes most
smaller stations from undertaking documentaries or other expensive programming35 and compels them to use the canned spots composed by the American
Cancer Society.
No previous case has ever specifically applied the fairness doctrine to a commercial product advertisement. 36 In Sam Morris,37 while holding that radio
advertisements for alcoholic beverages can raise "substantial issues of public
importance," 38 the FCC refused to apply the requirements of the fairness doctrine, reasoning that it would be unfair to punish one station for the industrywide practice of broadcasting such commercials. 39 However, this decision made
it quite clear that merely because a broadcast takes the form of a commercial,
it is not impossible for a controversial issue to be raised. 40 Nevertheless, no
license has ever been denied solely on fairness doctrine grounds. 4' Absent bad
faith or unreasonable judgment in licensee compliance with the fairness doctrine,
the FCC will not deny a renewal application. 42 Since it was not a renewal proceeding, there was no question of license revocation at the instant proceeding. It
is probable that the Commission used the opportunity presented by Mr. Banz32. "If the Commission's ruling stands, the impact of smoking on health will become the
most significant public issue on which broadcasters will regularly be presenting broadcast
material. It need hardly be suggested that . . . it does not deserve this degree of prominence.
In the health field alone, there are numerous issues equally as important. Many other
national and international issues vie for and receive attention from conscientious broadcast
licensees. Their allocation of time to the broad range of important public issues will suffer
if their acceptance of product advertising is held to impose a strait-jacket on their freedom
of selection of controversial issues." Letter from WCBS-TV to FCC, supra note 30, at 8.
33. See Barron, The Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine: An
Evaluation, 30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1961).
34. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1967, at 55, cols. 3-4.
35.

Instead of using other types of pro~ramming, one Chicago channel has given $17,500

worth of free commercial time in one month. Id.
36.

The Report on Editorializing and the Fairness Primer, which together set forth the

basic fairness doctrine guidelines, make no reference to product advertising. CBS made a
point of this silence in its request for rescission of the Commission's ruling. Letter from
WCBS-TV to FCC, supra note 30, at 3-4.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

11 F.C.C. 197 (1946).
Id. at 199.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199.
Barron, supra note 33, at 4.
Fairness Primer at 10416.
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haf's complaint to extend the doctrine, forewarning the broadcasting industry
that its presentation of the cigarette controversy will be taken into consideration
at renewal time.
In the past, the FCC's broadcast advertising policy has been less concerned
with particular products advertised than with such matters as false and misleading advertising and excessive commercialization. 43 In its early history, the
Commission occasionally weighed the qualitative merits of advertisements;"4
but generally it has been cautious about delineating rules since it recognizes that
5
advertising provides the means of support for broadcasting stations.1 However,
6
by imposing on broadcasters an affirmative duty to offer free' time to groups
opposing cigarette smoking, the instant decision may signify a softening of the
to restrict the content of material which supplies the broadFCC's reluctance
47
casters' profit.

The ruling suggests that a "significant" amount of time be provided for health
announcements. 48 Assuming licensees will employ spot announcements rather
than use other types of programming, they still face the problem of deciding
how frequently the announcements must be aired. There is no standard by which
to ascertain the minimum amount of time which would satisfy the FCC. The
General Counsel for the Commission has ventured his personal opinion that
compliance with the instant ruling would be satisfactory if approximately one
third of the total time devoted to cigarette commercials were granted to the antismoking point of view.4 9 Using that proportion, a broadcaster would have an
affirmative obligation to offer an immense amount of time to organizations such
as the American Cancer Society or other anti-smoking groups. For example, on
NBC from May 29 to June 4, 1967, 34 cigarette spots were shown, 5 per cent of
a total of 713 spots.50 At a 3 to 1 ratio, 10 to 12 anti-cigarette spots of comparable duration would fulfill the broadcaster's obligation, about 1.7 per cent of total
available spots. By continuing to advertise, the cigarette companies would be providing time for those critical of their own product, and the broadcaster would
receive no compensation for time he could sell to other commercial advertisers.
43.

Ramey, The Federal Communications Commission and Broadcast Advertising: An

Analytical Review, 20 Fed. Com. B.J. 71, 72-79 (1966).

44. KXL Broadcasters, 4 F.C.C. 186 (1937) (lotteries); Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co.,
2 F.C.C. 76 (1935) (birth-control devices); United States Broadcasting Corp., 2 F.C.C. 20S,
218-19 (1935) (ads by dergymen); Scroggin & Co. Bank, I F.C.C. 194 (1935) (advice on
marriage and family matters). See generally Ramey, The Federal Communications Com-

mission and Broadcast Advertising: An Analytical Review, 20 Fed. Com. B.J. 71 (1966).
45. "[Tlhe Commission realizes that some profit must be obtained because stations are
not always licensed to philanthropic . . . organizations." WGAR Broadcasting Co., 4 F.C.C.

540, 549 (1937).
46. John Norris, 1 F.C.C.2d 541, 542 (1965).
47. Report on Editorializing at 1251; Capitol Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1135, 1140
(1965).
48. 8 F.C.C. 2d at 382.

49. N.Y. Times, June 3, 1967, at 1, 20, cols. 1, 6.
50. Id., June 11, 1967, § 4, at 2, col. 6.
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In view of the broadcasters' already tightly packed program schedules, it
would be very difficult for a station to increase the number of spots available to
advertisers. 51 Therefore, a station would either have to increase its advertising
rates to cover the loss resulting from the free time granted or cut time offered
to the cigarette companies to avoid granting a large amount of corresponding free
time. The latter alternative would mean sacrificing some of the huge amounts
of money spent by the tobacco industry on television ads.52 The tobacco industry
itself is likely to curtail its broadcast advertising, placing more emphasis on
other media. 53 It has been claimed that the resultant loss in billings could put
numerous broadcasters out of business. 54 Moreover, it is likely that the broadcasters could not deduct the free air time granted as a charitable contribution
for income tax purposes. 55
In the past, issues concerning health56 and issues which have been the subject
of congressional activity 57 have been brought within the purview of the fairness
doctrine. In the instant case, the FCC cited the 1964 Report of the Surgeon
General's Committee and the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
of 1965 as authority for considering normal use of cigarettes a health hazard. 8
The ruling was "tailored to carry out the Congressional purpose" of promoting
"smoking education campaigns."5 9
The decision imposes a duty to broadcast information in opposition to cigarette
commercials per se, irrespective of their content, and may therefore be criticized
to the extent that cigarette commercials do not raise a controversial health
issue.60 The Federal Trade Commission already prohibits specific health claims
in cigarette advertising, 61 and the Radio and Television Codes of the National
51. Furthermore, a significant increase in the proportion of commercial to sustaining time
might jeopardize a renewal application, since the FCC will probably demand an explanation
if actual commercial time exceeds 10% of that proposed in the license application. In the
Matter of Amendment of Section IV (Statement of Program Service) of Broadcast Application Forms 301, 303, 314, and 315, 1 F.C.C.2d 439 (1965).

52.
of this
53.
54.
55.
56.

The tobacco industry spent a total of $297,500,000 on all advertising in 1966. 66.6%
total was spent for television ads. Advertising Age, July 3, 1967, at 1, 53, cols. 1, 2-5.
Id., June 26, 1967, at 1, 157, cols. 5-6, 2-3.
Id.
Rev. Rul. 67-236, 1967 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 30, at 6.
Broadcast of "Living Should Be Fun," 33 F.C.C. 101, 107 (1962)

(flourdation of

water; krebiozen in treatment of cancer).
57. WSOC Broadcasting Co., 17 P & F Radio Reg. 548 (1958) (pay-TV); New Broadcasting Co., 6 P & F Radio Reg. 258 (1950) (Nat'l Fair Employment Practices Comm'n).
58. 8 F.C.C.2d at 382.
59. Id.
60. Letter from WCBS-TV to FCC, supra note 30, at 1, 4-6. See Advertising Age, July
10, 1967, at 3, col. 4, where the National Association of Broadcasters stated: "'So long as a
lawful business sells lawful products by means of lawful advertising, that business has the
inviolate right to convince the consumer that the brand of the product being advertised
should be purchased instead of a competitor's brand. Thus, product advertising in and of
itself does not involve the discussion of a public issue.' "
61. FTC Release, Sept. 22, 1955, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. f17,894, at 12,802-03.
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Association of Broadcasters also impose restrictions on advertising cigarettes as

healthful.62 These limitations on the content of cigarette commercials indicate

that the promotion of a particular cigarette as "attractive or enjoyable" does
not automatically mean an affirmative claim is made as to its healthfulness.03
The FCC has noted that there is a distinction between implicit and explicit
advocation of one side of a particular issue. The broadcast of church services
does not create a duty to broadcast an atheistic or agnostic point of view, whereas
an explicit attack on atheism or agnosticism might give rise to such an obligation. 64 If no explicit health claims are made by cigarette commercials, it is arguable that there is no justification for applying the fairness doctrine.
Possible extension of the fairness doctrine to other products has caused considerable apprehension in the broadcasting industry.6 5 While it is true that the
FCC expressly limited its holding to cigarettes, 0 it can be argued that the fairness doctrine could logically be applied to other products advertised over the
airwaves. 67 It has been suggested that such controversial products as automobiles,
toothpaste, candy, beer and proprietary drugs would come under fairness doctrine principles. 68 Controversy over automobile safety has become important
enough to cause federal investigation and legislation. Unlike cigarette commercials, which avoid affirmative health claims, automobile advertisements on radio
and television boast specific safety innovations. In so far as automobile safety
claims are often explicit, it would seem that the FCC, in making its initial fairness doctrine incursion into broadcast advertising, should have applied the
doctrine to automobile rather than cigarette commercials. While an extension is
possible, it seems unlikely that the FCC will depart further from traditional
fairness doctrine application by embarking upon a program of concerted regulation of commercials, the lifeblood of the broadcasting industry.
62. New cigarette ad guidelines took effect on Sept. 1, 1967. See Advertising Age, July
24, 1967, at 3, col. 1. Robert B. Meyner, administrator of the NAB cigarette code, has
criticized the ruling: "'The FTC's present position . . . is that a cigaret advertisement
makes an affirmative health claim if it does not portray smokers as a sickly, miserable lot
and if it does not recite that cigaret smoking is unhealthy and a vice . . . .The code is
operated on the principle that affirmative claims for health, distinction, success and sezual
attraction are not allowed. The code has not descended to the illogical position that the
absence of any claim in these areas is automatically a claim that cigaret smoking is safe."'
Advertising Age, Aug. 21, 1967, at 1, 97, cols. 1, 5. But see 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 1 50,174 at
55,289 (1967).
63. Letter from WCBS-TV to FCC, supra note 30.
64. Madalyn Murray, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 263, 266-67 (1965) (concurring opinion).
See also Robert H. Scott, 25 P & F Radio Reg. 349 (1963); Letter from Wayne Coy to
Edward J. Heffron, 3 P & F Radio Reg. 264a (1948).
65. See generally Letter from WCBS-TV to FCC, supra note 30, at 9; N.Y. Times, June
4, 1967, at 57, col. 1; id., June 11, 1967, at 5, col. 1.
66. 8 F.C.C.2d at 381.
67. Letter from WCBS-TV to FCC, supra note 30, at 9.
68. Advertising Age, June 26, 1967, at 1, 157, cols. 4-5, 2-3. Many other products have
been suggested, e.g., petroleum products, food and grocery products, toiletries, and many
textile products. Id. Advertising Age, July 10, 1967, at 3, cols. 5, 1-3.
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Work Party Rendcrs

Vessel Unseaworthy.-Plaintiff, a crewman on defendant's vessel, fell and
injured his back while unraveling a rope during a docking operation. Plaintiff
claimed negligence and unseaworthiness arising from the assignment of an inadequate number of men to perform the task. The trial court referred the issue
of negligence to the jury, which held for the defendant. On the issue of unseaworthiness the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, holding that the
facts failed as a matter of law to constitute unseaworthiness. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.' The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to allow the plaintiff to present his theory of unseaworthiness to the jury.
Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724 (1967).
The doctrine of unseaworthiness 2 requires a shipowner to furnish a vessel and
appurtenances, including hull, equipment and manning, reasonably safe for its
intended use., "Proper equipment" has been held to mean gear that is sufficient
in quantity,4 mechanically sound and properly used5 for each individual task.0
For a vessel to be seaworthy with respect to personnel, it is necessary that the
shipowner provide a crew which is sufficient in number and in competency to
meet the normal contingencies of the voyage. 7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the instant case to resolve a question
which had caused a conflict among the circuits. 8 "The single legal question pre1. Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 356 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1966).
2. In The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903), the Supreme Court, in dictum, outlined the general content of unseaworthiness, which became an essential legal remedy to complement the
injured seamens' original basis of recovery through maintenance and cure. Maintenance and
cure was the earliest of the injured seaman's legal rights and entitled him to adequate
medical treatment, food and lodging until going ashore, and wages to the extent of tile
voyage for which he contracted. In 1920 the Merchant Marine Act (Jones Act) § 33, 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1964) further enlarged his remedies by allowing a seaman to recover damages
for the negligence of an employer or other employees. For a concise history of the judicial
development and expansion of the doctrine see Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S.
539, 543-49 (1960).
3. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960). The duty to provide a
seaworthy vessel is absolute and non-delegable. See id. at 548-49, which cites Seas Shipping
Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) (shipowner's liability extends to longshoremen performing work traditionally done by seamen) and Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96,
102 (1944).
4. The instant case refers to loading an excessive quantity of rope on a pulley as
a clear case of unseaworthiness. 386 U.S. at 728.
5. "Properly" includes both the proper use, Ferrante v. Swedish Am. Lines, 331 F.2d 571
(3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 801 (1964), and the proper purpose, Crumady v. The
Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
6. Mere availability of proper equipment will not satisfy the seaworthiness requirement.
The test of seaworthiness is applied, "when and where the work is to be done." Mahnich
v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 104 (1943).
7. Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1952). See also Boudoin
v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); Robinson v. S.S. Atlantic Starling, 369 F.2d
69 (5th Cir. 1966); The Magdapur, 3 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
8. For a discussion of this conflict see 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1180 (1966).
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sented by this case," the Court noted, "is whether a vessel is unseaworthy when
its officers assign too few crewmen to perform a particular task in a safe and prudent manner. ' In American President Lines, Ltd. v. Rcdfern,10 the ninth circuit
had held that such an assignment creates a dangerous condition rendering a
vessel unseaworthy. The plaintiff in Redcrn was ordered to open a stuck gate
valve by himself, although the task involved the turning of a large wheel and
normally required two men. In his suit for personal injuries, the plaintiff alleged
both negligence and unseaworthiness."1 The court held that the stuck valve and
lack of assistance rendered the ship unseaworthy. In effect, Redfern held that
the assignment of one man to perform the job, given the condition of the valve,
had created an unseaworthy condition.
In the instant case, the second circuit decided that a seaman injured solely
as result of the act or omission of an otherwise competent officer had to prove
negligence.' 2 In so declining to increase the potential liability of a shipowner
without fault under the seaworthy doctrine, the court of appeals reasoned that
such an extension "in the absence of legislation" 13 would impose upon the shipowner the duty, already explicitly negated by the Supreme Court," of providing
an "accident proof" vessel. 15 The Supreme Court has now resolved this conflict
by including such a factual situation within the doctrine of unseaworthiness and
thus increasing the area of a shipowner's absolute liability. In an effort to reconcile its holding with past decisions, the Court reasoned that a shipowner's responsibility should not be less when he employs men rather than machines and
held the requirement of an adequate and sufficient ship's crew to be as inclusive
and demanding as those respecting its equipment.10 The Court found that the
employment of an insufficient number of men for a particular job and the
9. 386 US. at 724.
10. 345 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1965).
11. Id. at 631-32. A literal reading of the decision might suggest that it was both the
stuck valve and the lack of assistance which created the unseaworthy condition. However,
since "all valves have a tendency to stick on occasion, due to temperature changes" this
particular valve was actually "within the normal range of maritime appliances" and could
not by itself render the vessel unseaworthy. Id. Thus it was dearly the a.sgnment of too
few men to operate the stuck valve which created the unseaworthiness.
12. 356 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1966).
13. Id. at 251. This desire expressed by the court to leave the task of expansion of the
doctrine of unseaworthiness to Congress has been criticized since the doctrine itself, unlike
the theory of negligence under the Jones Act, is considered under "general maritime law"
and has been both defined and expanded by the decisions of the courts themselves. "No
area of federal law is judge-made at its source to such an extent as is the law of admiralty."
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See
also 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1180, 1183 (1966).
14. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
15. 356 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1966).
16. The Court thus equated the requirement of gear sufficient in quantity with the
requirement of a crew sufficient in numbers; gear that is mechanically sound, with a competent crew; and the proper use of equipment, with the proper use of the men for each
individual task.
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resulting misuse of the men constituted unseaworthiness making it necessary
to protect the seaman "from dangerous conditions beyond his control."' 17
By expanding the scope of unseaworthiness, American courts have pursued a
technique of risk distribution whereby the financial burden of seamens' injuries
resulting from the inherent and frequent dangers of the enterprise, fall upon the
shipowner, "because he is in a better position, by means of prices and insurance,
to shift it to the public."' 8 The critics of this system of risk distribution"' maintain that the shipping industry, so vital to the nation's economy and defense, 20
could be crippled and priced out of its market by the expanded financial liability.
They cite the 600%5 rise in insurance rates in the industry between 1945 and
1954 as well as the large number of steamship companies which have gone out
of business 2' as evincing the fact that the "shipping industry is not the horn
of plenty ... envisioned by the courts. ' 22 If it is socially undesirable for either
the traditionally helpless 23 seaman or his employer, the shipowner, to bear the
24
burden, it might be asked who should bear the expense?
A critic of the risk-distribution theory might also ask whether the performance
of a particular task by an inadequate number of seamen constitutes unseaworthiness only when the task is performed pursuant to an officer's order. Since fault
is not an element of unseaworthiness, 25 it might follow that the courts would
further expand the doctrine to include cases where an insufficient number of
men take it upon themselves to perform a task which they feel necessary. If
the Court were to go this far, it would in effect be requiring the shipowner to
provide an accident-free vessel20 and thus be making him an insurer. If, how17. 386 U.S. at 728.
18. W. Prosser, Torts § 79, at 542 (3d ed. 1964). For an analysis of the theory of "risk
distribution" and its theoretical justifications, see Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961). The application of the theory of
risk distribution to the doctrine of unseaworthiness is examined in 75 Yale L.J. 1174 (1966).
19. See Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1137 (1963).
20. Id. at 1149. See also White, A New Look at the Shipowner's Right-Over for Shipboard Injuries, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 717 (1960).
21. See Comment, Expanding the Warranty of Seaworthiness: Social Welfare or Maritime
Disaster, 9 Vii. L. Rev. 422, 440-41 (1964).
22. Id. at 440.
23. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 413 (1963).
24. "If there is a genuine social interest in preserving the American shipping industry,
the government, rather than the worker should pay the subsidy." 75 Yale L.J. 1174, 1188
(1966).
25. "It [unseaworthiness] is essentially a species of liability without fault . . . .It is a
form of absolute duty owing to all within the range of its humanitarian policy." Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1946). Mr. Justice Stewart stated in reference to
the Sieracki case: "From that day to this, the decisions of this court have undeviatingly
reflected an understanding that the owner's duty to furnish a seaworthy ship is absolute
and completely independent of his duty ... to exercise reasonable care." Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960).
26. The Supreme Court insists that the shipowner's duty does not extend this far. 362
U.S. at 550.
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ever, the Court should choose not to expand the doctrine of unseaworthiness so
as to include such cases, it might properly be accused of allowing the concept
of fault to encroach upon the doctrine of unseaworthiness. The only conceivable
basis for holding that unseaworthiness exists in cases where an officer or employee
of the shipowner assigns too few men to perform a particular task and not holding unseaworthiness when too few men undertake the task themselves is the
absence of fault on the part of the shipowner. However, the courts have emphatically stressed that liability under the doctrine of unseaworthiness is completely
27
distinct from the concept of fault.

The dissent in the present case raises the interesting question of whether it
was necessary to remand the issue of unseaworthiness to the jury, which had
already found that the defendant had not been negligent. Though negligence
and unseaworthiness are independent,2 8 the dissent suggested that they may be
coextensive when the facts involve the human element, namely, the assignment
by the officer. To establish whether the third mate was negligent in making the
assignment the jury had to consider whether "under the circumstances a reasonably prudent man would not have given such an order," 2 i.e., whether he
exercised due care. The conditions surrounding the docking operation were such
that the exercise of due care could only have resulted in the mate's assigning
the proper number of men to uncoil the rope in the absence of an emergency. °
In an emergency, it is conceivable that he could have exercised due care under
the circumstances and, nevertheless, have created an unseaworthy condition. The
dissenting justices, however, stated that "no such special facts" 31 existed here.
Absent such emergency, then, an order made in the exercise of due care could
only result in the assignment of the correct number of men to the job. Thus,
when the jury decided there was no negligence, it necessarily failed to believe
the testimony to the effect that more than two men were required for the job.
But, by deciding that only two men were necessary, the jury also determined
that there was no unseaworthiness. Naturally, the validity of this theory depends
upon the accuracy of the conclusion that if the third mate had exercised reasonable care in the circumstances of the docking operation, he necessarily had to
assign a safe number of men to the rope. The pertinent facts reveal that as the
ship was engaged in its docking operation, the officer on the bridge decided
another mooring line was necessary as a spring line.32 As all the other crewmen
were occupied with other lines, the third mate assigned to plaintiff and another
"exceptionally strong and capable" seaman the task of putting out a new line
27. Supra note 24.

28. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer Inc., 362 US. 539, 549 (1960). See also Alaska S.S. Co.
v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
29. 356 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Metzger v. SS. Kirsten Torm, 245 F. Supp.
227, 231 (D. Md. 1965).

30. Prosser defines such a situation as one in which the "actor is left no time for thought,
or is reasonably so disturbed or excited, that he cannot weigh alternative courses of action,

and must make a speedy decision, based very largely upon impulse or gues." W. Prosser,
supra note 18, at 171-72.
31. 386 U.S. at 730.
32.

Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 356 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1966).
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"'as quickly as possible.' "33 It was during this operation, while tugging at the
top of the coil, that the plaintiff slipped and was injured. The "urgency of getting out the new line, the tasks being performed by the other men [engaged
during the docking operation], the condition of the current, wind and so on"'"
may not have been pressing enough to prevent the third mate, in the exercise of
due care, from making the correct determination as to whether the particular
men involved could safely carry the rope. If, as the jury decided, the third mate
was not negligent, after making this determination, he could not have assigned
too few men to the job.
It may also be maintained that the conditions surrounding the docking operation did create an emergency grave enough to occasion the issuance of an order
prudently made but, nevertheless, resulting in a faulty assignment. In such an
emergency, the third mate might have exercised due care under the circumstances
and still, without fault, have created an unseaworthy condition by assigning too
few men. Thus, the issue in the instant case would become quite simple. Only if
the circumstances surrounding the docking operation were of an extraordinary
nature could the third mate have made a prudent decision and nevertheless
created an unseaworthy condition. The jury has already decided that the decision
was prudent. Thus, the remand in this case should have required the trial judge
to instruct the jury that they may decide the issue of unseaworthiness only if
they find that an extraordinary, i.e., emergency, situation existed. If they find no
emergency, then it is unnecessary to decide the question of unseaworthiness-the
issue of the sufficiency of the assigned number of men under ordinary circumstances having already been decided by the first jury when they found no negligence.

Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Evidence Obtained During
Police Investigation of an Emergency Held Admissible.-A police officer,
while on radio patrol, received instructions to go to an address where a man was
reportedly causing a disturbance. The officer responded to the call at what
turned out to be a rooming house, whose manager had made the complaint. The
manager led the policeman to a room out of which came noises of shouting,
screaming and hand clapping. The officer knocked at the door and a voice
answered: "Wait a minute, I'm not dressed." The policeman, after waiting for a
minute, directed the manager to open the door with his pass-key. The defendant
was found standing in the middle of the room with a syringe, eye dropper and a
needle in his hands. The policeman then seized the evidence and arrested the
defendant who was subsequently convicted of possession of narcotics. The appellate term in the first judicial department affirmed the conviction. The defendant appealed maintaining that since the officer did not comply with the
statute requiring announcement of office and purpose prior to making a nonconsensual entry for the purpose of arrest, the arrest was illegal and the evidence
secured was inadmissible. The court of appeals, in a 4-3 decision, affirmed the
33. Id.
34.

Id. at 249.
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conviction on the ground that the statute was inapplicable to this set of facts and
that the entry of the police was investigatory and privileged. People v. Gallmon,
19 N.Y.2d 389, 227 N.E.2d 284, 280 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1967).
In Mapp v. Ohio1, the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained by unconstitutional searches and seizures is inadmissible in a state court.2 A search is constitutional if conducted pursuant to a legal search warrant, if it is carried out
with the consent of the person whose premises are being searched or if the search
is incident to a lawful arrest.3 Since the policeman in the case at bar did not have
a search warrant, the validity of the search must have been based on one of the
other categories.
Since the defendant, himself, never consented to the search, to predicate the
constitutionality of the search on a traditional theory of consent it is necessary to
find that the night manager had authority to consent for the defendant. The court
held that the hotel manager did have the authority to allow the police to enter
the defendant's room 4 since in an emergency the management of a hotel should
be able to enter a guest's room regardless of the guest's wishes.5 But in the
instant case no emergency situation existed. Thus, the holding of the court is difficult to reconcile with recent Supreme Court decisions. In Stoner v. California,
the Supreme Court held that evidence acquired by a search of the defendant's
hotel room was inadmissible when consent was given by the clerk of the hotel
without the defendant's permission. The Stoner Court said:
It is important to bear in mind that it was the petitioner's constitutional right which
was at stake here, and not the night clerk's nor the hotel's. It was a right, therefore,
which only the petitioner could waive by word or deed, either directly or through an
agent. It is true that the night clerk clearly and unambiguously consented to the
search. But there is nothing in the record to indicate that the police had any basis
whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been authorized by the petitioner to
permit the police to search the petitioner's room.7
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Id. at 654. Mapp overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 US. 25 (1949), which held that:
"[I]n a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not
forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." Id. at 33.
Mapp had the effect of applying what had previously been federal standards of search and
seizure to state prosecutions in state courts.
3. People v. Yarmosh, 11 N.Y.2d 397, 400, 184 N.E2d 165, 166, 230 N.YS.2d 185, 187
(1962); People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 373, 179 N.E.2d 478, 482, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462, 466

(1961).
4. 19 N.Y.2d at 392-93, 227 N.E.2d at 286-87, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 359-60. The court bases
this authority on the decision in DeWolf v. Ford, 193 N.Y. 397, 86 N.E. 527 (1909) which
held: "If the guest is assigned to a room upon the express or implied understanding that he
is to be the sole occupant thereof during the time that it is set apart for his use, the innkeeper
retains a right of access thereto only at such proper times and for such reasonable purposes as
may be necessary in the general conduct of the inn or in attending to the needs of the particular guest." Id. at 403, 86 N.E. at 530.
5. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 197(e), Illustration 8 (1965).
6. 376 US. 483 (1964).
7. Id. at 489.
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The instant court noted that the fact that a rooming house was involved was
"critically significant" and inferred that the constitutional rights of a guest in a
rooming house are not the same as those of a tenant in demised premises. The
weight of authority, however, is to the contrary. A guest in a hotel room is entitled to the same protection against unreasonable searches and seizures as is a
tenant in an apartment, and these rights cannot be waived by the management of
the hotel on behalf of the occupant. 8 Although the majority here indicated that
the search in question was validated by the manager's consent, this was not the
sole basis for the decision.
The court, however, did not predicate the constitutionality of the search on the
theory that it was incident to a lawful arrest. The lawfulness of an arrest is determined by the law of the state in which the arrest takes place, 9 and each state has
the right and the obligation to develop rules to meet the practical demands of
criminal investigation and law enforcement. 10 In New York a police officer has
the authority to arrest without a warrant under fixed circumstances," and it is
arguable that this authority would extend to the facts presented here. 1 2 Section
178 of the N.Y. Code of Criminal Procedure, the so-called "no-knock" statute,
forbids the police officer to break the door unless he first announces his authority
and purpose.' 3 Here there was no attempt to comply with the statute. The district attorney contended, however, that entry by a policeman by means of a passkey is not a breaking within the meaning of the statute, 14 and secondly, that
8. Id. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (rented house); United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (hotel room); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949)
(hotel room).
9. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963).
10. Id. at 34. Obviously these rules must not violate "the constitutional proscription of
unreasonable searches and seizures and the concomitant command that evidence so seized is
inadmissible against one who has standing to complain." Id.
11. N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 177 (Supp. 1967).
12. N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 177(1) empowers the police officer to make an arrest,
without a warrant, when he has reasonable grounds for believing that a crime is being committed in his presence. In the case at bar the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that
the defendant was guilty of disorderly conduct because of the unusual sounds emanating
from the defendant's room. However, an argument could be made that the crime of disorderly conduct was already completed prior to the entry by the policeman for the purpose of arrest, thus requiring the policeman to obtain a warrant prior to making the arrest
for disorderly conduct.
13. N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 178: "To make an arrest, as provided in the last section,
the officer may break open an outer or inner door or window of a building, if, after notice of
his office and purpose, he be refused admittance."
14. The meaning of the phrase "break open an outer or inner door or window" has not
been expressly determined in the New York courts. The brief filed by the district attorney
suggests that the statute should not apply to every non-consensual entry; he suggests that
entry by a policeman by means of a pass-key is not a breaking within the meaning of the "noknock" statute. The view taken by the respondent is that the term "breaking" necessarily
carries with it the connotation of physical force and destruction of property. Brief for
Respondent at 5-6. The court did not address itself to this contention, but by inference, ac-
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even if it were, noncompliance with the statute would not demand the exclusion
of the evidence obtained after the entry.15 The instant court indicated that the
entry by the police was not a breaking within the "no-knock" statute but that
if an entry had been made for the purpose of arrest, then compliance with the
'"no-knock" statute would be mandatory and a failure to comply would result in a
setting aside of the conviction."0 The court held that the "no-knock" statute was
inapplicable because at the time the police came to the rooming house they did
not have an arrest-making state of mind. The court reasoned that since the policeman had not come to the rooming house to make an arrest, they were not bound
by the procedural requirements of the "no-knock" statute. The police came to the
rooming house to investigate an unusual, noisy disturbance and the action that
they would have to take was uncertain. Certainly, they did not realize that they
would be making an arrest until they opened the door. And as the court noted:
"[T] he fact that the defendant was committing a crime does not retroactively
invalidate the entry for it is not defendant's actions but the intent and pur7
pose of the policeman prior to the entry that controls."'
Basically, the holding of the court is that in an emergency situation the police
cepted the prevailing view that every non-consensual entry is a "breaking." The purpose of
the notification requirement is to protect the individual from invasions of his privacy
without his first being apprised that he is being sought pursuant to valid process. Miller v.
United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1958); Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C.
Cir. 1949). In Ker v. California, 374 US. 23 (1963), the Supreme Court assumed that entry
by the use of a pass-key by the police was a "breaking" within the meaning of the California
"no-knock" statute. Thus the contention of the district attorney that "breaking" implies
physical force is untenable in the light of prior cases dealing with similar statutes. It is the
fact of entry, under the circumstances, and not the means used which constitutes the
"breaking."
15. Brief for Respondent at 6-7. State courts are required to invoke the exclusionary rule
only when the search is unreasonable, that is to say, unconstitutional. A search can meet
constitutional standards even though it is illegal with respect to state standards. It is within
the discretion of the court to make the decision of whether or not the evidence should be
admitted.
In Ker v. California, 374 US. 23 (1963), the Supreme Court upheld a conviction which was
based on evidence secured from a search which was preceded by a "breaking," although there
had been no announcement by the police of their authority and purpose. The Court held that
the lawfulness of the arrest was to be determined by the California law which provides that,
under exceptional circumstances, the need to state authority and purpose need not be complied with. Id. at 37-38. This decision, to some extent, lends authority to the contention of
the respondent that even if the "no-knock" statute is applicable to all non-consensual entries,
the failure of the policeman to comply with it does not automatically call for enforcement by
the exclusionary rule.
16. The New York courts have always required strict compliance with the "no-knock"
statute and where the police have failed to comply with it, the arrest has been held illegal,
and the evidence suppressed. People v. Griffin, 22 App. Div. 2d 957, 256 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1964)
(mem.) ; People v. Goldfarb, 34 MAisc. 2d 866, 229 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Sup. Ct. 1962). This would
seem to imply that the New York courts, unlike the courts of California, feel that the "noknock" statute is of constitutional dimensions.
17. 19 N.Y.2d at 393, 227 N.E.2d at 287, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
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may enter without regard to any procedural limitations. Thus an entry made for
a purely investigatory purpose, in an emergency, is privileged. This would appear
to be a new, distinct category of constitutional search. The rationale for this is
clear. The police serve many functions within the community that have little or
nothing to do with the apprehension of criminals.' 8 If not privileged to make an
entry for investigatory purposes, the police will be hampered in their salutary
duty of aiding persons in distress.' 9
With the appearance of this new privilege the problem arises of determining
when an entry is made for purely investigatory purposes and when, for arrest.
This court apparently puts great faith in the expertise of trial court judges. It
said:
[T]he trial courts are familiar with police practices and should be able to determine
when an entry is in truth only for investigative purposes based on privileged grounds
without any intention to make an arrest. In making that determination the courts
must be cognizant that there is a strong factual inference that an entry which results
in an arrest or seizure of evidence was for the purpose of effecting an arrest or
seizure. That inference should prevail unless the police establish a different purpose
justified by objective evidence of a privileged basis for making the entry. In this
undisputedly established a different purpose and a privileged basis
case the evidence
20
for the entry.
This reasoning may well give less trouble in future cases than it does here. The
district attorney had argued that the police officer, standing outside the defendant's room, had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was guilty
of disorderly conduct. Thus, the prosecutor contended that the officer had power
to make an arrest on that charge and that the entry was effected for this purpose. 21 Given this obvious arrest-making state of mind by the policeman, it is
difficult to understand on what grounds the court was able to rebut the "strong
factual inference." Furthermore, the court pointed out that these privileged
investigatory entries must be limited to emergency situations. Two conspicuous
circumstances in the instant case would seem to nullify the existence of an
emergency. First, if there had been an emergency situation inside the room (or if
the policeman had so believed) why did the policeman wait a full minute before
22
Secondly, the unusual
seeking entrance to the room by use of the pass-key?
sounds had been emanating from the room for several days; yet, when the
police knocked, the noises ceased and a man coherently answered, "Wait a
minute, I'm not dressed." This is not the language of a person in distress.
Under the holding of this case evidence obtained by the police after entering
premises to investigate a reported emergency would be admissible even though the
police had no warrant, the defendant had not consented to the entry and the
18.
police
19.
20.
21.
22.

See 2 C. Alexander, Law of Arrest § 637 (1949), which discusses the work done by
which is in no way connected with crime.
19 N.Y.2d at 394, 227 N.E.2d at 288, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
Id. at 394-95, 227 N.E.2d at 288, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62.
Brief for Respondent at 3-4.
19 N.Y.2d at 391, 227 N.E.2d at 286, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
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entry was not made to effect a lawful arrest. A search made pursuant to this new

privilege could, of course, become unreasonable and thus unconstitutional, when
the police act beyond the necessities of the emergency. The instant court's clear
warning that the new privilege should be strictly construed must be followed by
future courts, if further erosion of the individual's privacy is to be avoided.

Impleader-United States Permitted to Implead a State on an Indemnity
Contract.-Plaintiff sustained injuries while employed as a seaman aboard a
vessel owned by the United States and being used by the State of New York as a
training ship for the New York Maritime College. A resident of New Jersey, he
sued the United States in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York and asserted a claim for damages arising out of the injuries caused by
the unseaworthiness of the vessel and by the negligence of the United States and
its employees. The United States then sought to implead the State of New
York,1 claiming a right of indemnity based upon contractual obligations and
warranties. New York moved to dismiss the third-party complaint for lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the state." The court denied the
motion to dismiss, holding that the state could properly be impleaded. Williams
v. United States, 42 F.R.D. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
A fact pattern almost identical to that in the instant case arose in Parks v.
United States,3 a case relied upon heavily by New York in the instant case in
support of its jurisdictional and constitutional arguments. Parks involved an
action under the Federal Tort Claims Act brought by a citizen of New York
seeking to recover damages arising out of a flood control project. The United
States sought to implead the State of New York on the basis of an indemnity
agreement similar to the agreement in the instant case, but the court granted
New York's motion to dismiss on the ground that a state could not properly be
impleaded in a district court.
New York claimed that it is not a "person" within the meaning of Rule
14(a) 4 and based its contention on the definition of "person" found in the United
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides: "At any time after commencement of the action a
defending party ... may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him."
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Although the third-party complaint was filed pursuant to Rule
56 of the Supreme Court Admiralty Rules, the motion to dismiss was deemed as having
been made pursuant to Rule 12(b) because the Admiralty Rules had been merged into the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prior to any court action on the impleader. Therefore, as
the court points out in its decision, the issue, in effect, deals with practice under the Federal
Rules and the substantive law or procedural devices of admiralty practice have little to do
with the problem under discussion.
3. 241 F. Supp. 297 (NIDN.YN. 1965).
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a). "[A] defending party ... may cause a summons and complaint
to be served upon a person .

...

"
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States Code. 5 The court rejected this semantic argument in light of the legislative
history and liberal judicial interpretation of the Federal Rules.0 The court
pointed out, moreover, that the United States, as well as various state and7
municipal subdivisions, have been successfully impleaded in the federal courts.
The Parks case, however, had held that a state cannot be treated as a "person"
under Rule 14(a) and ignored the liberal tendency of other courts in interpreting
Rule 14(a). 8 It also ignored the intent of the Congress in providing this liberal
provision for the consolidation of actions and has been criticized for its incorrect application of the rule.10
The second argument posed by New York was that the court lacked jurisdiction over New York because the third-party action was not a suit "commenced
by the United States ... ."" Although the district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court of "[a]ll controversies between the United States
and a State,"' 2 New York argued that such jurisdiction is limited to actions which
are instigated by the United States and does not extend to third-party actions. In
United States v. Arizona'3 the defendant raised the identical argument and,
although the case was decided on other grounds, 14 the court stated in dictum that
"the United States may assert a right to recoupment against a state, if it has a
right, in a United States district court .... If the right over exists, this court is
of the opinion that it is implied that the right against anyone, individual or state,
is to be settled in a district court . . . .,,16The only previous case to decide this
5. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) provides that "the words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as
well as individuals."
6. 42 F.R.D. at 611-12. The liberal interpretation given to these Rules is best expressed
by the Supreme Court in British Transp. Comm'n v. United States, 354 U.S. 129, 138-39
(1957): "we hold it a necessary concomitant of jurisdiction . . . that the Court have power

to adjudicate all of the demands made and arising out of the same disaster. This too reflects
the basic policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Admiralty practice, which has
served as the origin of much of our modern federal procedure, should not be tied to the
mast of legal technicalities it has been the forerunner in eliminating from other federal
practices."
7. 42 F.R.D. at 614.
8. See note 6 supra.
9. See F. James, Jr., Civil Procedure § 10.20, at 506 (1965) ; 3 J. Moore, Federal Practice
1111
14.01(1)-(3), at 403-07 (2d ed. 1966).
10. 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 433 (1966).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1964).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2) (1964); 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1964); United States v. California,
328 F.2d 729 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817 (1964) (waiver of immunity not necessary
to confer jurisdiction on district court).
13. 214 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1954). Action under the Federal Tort Claims Act in which the
United States sought to implead the State of Arizona as a joint tort-feasor.
14. Id. at 392. The state's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint was granted
because there was no indemnity agreement between the parties and Arizona law permits
impleader only where the right to contribution is a contractual one.
15. Id. at 394.
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issue was Parks, which held that the district courts have jurisdiction over a state
only where the suit is originally brought by the United States. The present case,
however, held that in the absence of congressional intent to exclude third-party
actions from the purview of the section, it must be assumed that the district
courts do have jurisdiction in such cases. 16
The third-party action was "commenced" by the United States and it did
concern a dispute between the United States and a state. Therefore, even if the
question is to be decided by using the strict interpretation approach found in
Parks, a recognition that the third-party proceeding was a separate action commenced by the United States would still lead to a finding that the district court
had jurisdiction. Both the narrow approach used in Parks and the legislative
history approach employed by the instant case lead to the conclusion that the
district court had jurisdiction over the third-party action. It was the court's
failure in Parks to recognize the nature of the third-party action which led to its
finding that it was not an action commenced by the United States.
The main argument raised by New York in the instant case, however, was
that the allowance of impleader would subject it to a suit brought by a private
citizen and thus violate the sovereign immunity guaranteed to it by the Constitution. 17 It was contended that the United States' claim for total indemnity
would require New York to defend an action from which it is constitutionally
immune. The United States, on the other hand, argued that no suit would exist
between the plaintiff and New York as a result of the impleader, and that the
third-party complaint merely called upon New York to answer the plaintiff's
complaint in conformance with the indemnity agreement and contained no
demand against New York on behalf of the plaintiff. The controversy, in effect,
focused on the relationship of the parties involved in the third-party action and
on the nature of the impleader procedure itself.
Before determining whether the impleader would subject New York to a suit
by the plaintiff, an initial inquiry must be made concerning what constitutes a
8
suit. In Weston v. City Council of Charleston,1
the Court, addressing itself to the
question, stated: "The term is ...understood to apply to any proceeding in a
court of justice, by which an individual pursues that remedy in a court of
justice which the law affords him... [i] f a right is litigated between parties in a
court of justice, the proceeding by which the decision of the court is sought is
a suit."' 9 Therefore, it seems clear that the impleader must make some demand
on behalf of the plaintiff or place into litigation some right which the plaintiff
has against the state, in order for a suit to exist between the parties. That the
state may be called upon to answer allegations made by the plaintiff is insufficient to find a suit between the parties in the absence of some claim or right
16. 42 F.RD. at 614.
17. US. Const. amend. XI provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State

...

18. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 289 (1829).
19. Id. at 300. See also Ex parte New York, 256 US. 490, 500 (1921); Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 US. (6 Wheat.) 264, 407 (1821).
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being asserted against the state by, or on behalf of, the plaintiff. Although Rule
14(a) permits the plaintiff to amend his complaint to include a claim against the
third-party defendant, an amendment in this case would not be possible because
the state's sovereign immunity would prevent the plaintiff from doing so. This
discussion is limited to situations where the defendant alone makes a claim
against the third-party defendant and with the relationship that arises between
the plaintiff and third-party defendant as a result of the defendant's action.
The state's immunity from a suit commenced or prosecuted by the plaintiff,
a citizen of another state, or by any private individual is not questioned. 20 It has
also been held that a rule which is intended to control practices and procedures
in the courts, such as is Rule 14(a), cannot affect the substantive rights of the
parties.21 Therefore, there was no contention on the part of the United States
in the instant case that Rule 14(a) acts to waive the immunity of the states
when they are impleaded in the federal courts. It was the contention of the
United States that sovereign immunity never becomes an issue in such a case
because no suit exists between the plaintiff and the third-party defendant, and
that the effect of impleader is to litigate any rights or claims existing between
the third-parties only.
The nature of a third-party action based on an indemnity agreement has been
interpreted as follows: "The third party proceeding is predicted solely upon a
certain written indemnity agreement entered into by the third party defendant
and the defendant, and said proceeding raises no issue between the plaintiff and
third party defendant ....,,22
Perhaps the best illustration of the relationship
between the parties in a third-party action to the plaintiff is contained in
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.23 In Ryan, the plaintiff
contracted to load and unload defendant's ship and agreed to indemnify the
defendant from liability for the negligence of any of plaintiff's workers. The
cargo was negligently loaded and one of plaintiff's employees was injured while
attempting to unload the poorly stacked cargo. The worker sued the defendant
shipowner, who in turn sought to implead the plaintiff on the indemnity agreement. The plaintiff claimed that impleader was not possible in this situation because it thereby became subject to a suit by one of its employees and that it was
immune from such an action under Workmen's Compensation Law. The court
held that plaintiff's immunity from suit by an employee had nothing to do with
its contractual obligation to defendant and that the impleader was proper because it did not subject the plaintiff to the claim of the injured workman. The
court said that the effect of the impleader was to render the plaintiff potentially
liable on the indemnity agreement to the defendant and not to render it potentially liable to the workman for its tortious acts.
20. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944)
(state's consent to be sued in its own courts does not act as waiver of immunity from suit in
federal courts); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1889) (state must consent to be sued in a
federal court by one of its own citizens).
21. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
22. Chapin v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 638, 639 (D.S.D. 1951).
23. 350 U.S. 124 (1955).
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The Parks case upheld New York's argument under the Eleventh Amendment
by deciding that, although there was actually no suit between the plaintiff and
third-party defendant, subjecting New York to pretrial and trial proceedings as
though it were being sued directly by the plaintiff would nevertheless constitute
a violation of its sovereign immunity.2 4 The instant case, on the other hand,
adhered to the reasoning of Chapin and Ryan by holding that the nature of
impleader is not to create a suit between the plaintiff and third-party defendant
and that New York's immunity from suit is not properly an issue. The instant
case and Parks agreed that there is actually no suit between the plaintiff and the
impleaded third-party defendant. However, the Parks court reasoned that requiring the third-party defendant to engage in the necessary activities of a trial
would be tantamount to subjecting it to a suit and ignored the essential element
of a suit, which is the litigation and resolution of some right or claim asserted
by one party against another. It is precisely this litigation of rights and claims
which is lacking in third-party actions and from which the Eleventh Amendment
seeks to protect the states. The purpose of impleader is not to create a suit between the plaintiff and third-party defendant, but to "do away with the serious handicap to a defendant of a time difference between a judgment against
him, and a judgment in his favor against the third-party defendant."2 5
A consideration of the practicalities involved in cases of this nature is most
important. As the instant court pointed out, the plaintiff has nothing to gain
from a judgment against New York in favor of the United States, and such a
judgment would merely render New York liable on the indemnity agreement.20
It would not resolve any issues involving the plaintiff's claim and would not
serve to increase the amount of any judgment he might recover. Furthermore, a
judgment against New York would indicate that it would also have been liable
in a separate action, and it is to New York's advantage to participate with the
United States in defense of the main action.27 Such participation on the part of
New York represents a means of protection against its ultimate liability to the
United States on the indemnity agreement by affording it an opportunity to
contest the claims of the plaintiff and to pool its resources with those of the
defendant. Therefore, the plaintiff has nothing to gain if New York enters the
defense of the main action, and New York is thereby given a convenient opportunity to defeat the plaintiff's claim and to avoid further controversy.
One further point which the instant court touched upon briefly is the theory
of implied waiver of immunity. In Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama
State Dock Department,2s the State of Alabama was held to have waived immunity from suit by operating a railroad in interstate commerce. The Court said
that when a state performs activities which are removed from the sphere of activities usually carried on by government, and which are governed by laws which
allow civil redress in the federal courts for employees or private citizens, the state
24. 241 F. Supp. at 299.
25.
26.

3 J. Moore, Federal Practice f 14.04, at 412 (2d ed. 1966).
42 F.R.D. at 616.

27. See James, supra note 9, at 508.
28.

377 U.S. 184 (1964).
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has impliedly consented to be sued in the federal courts. Perhaps when a state is
party to an indemnity agreement, the act of signing the agreement also constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit.29 The act of signing such an agreement
is meaningless if the state is then allowed to avoid being impleaded, thereby
requiring additional unnecessary expense and litigation on the part of the United
States.
It has been argued that sovereign immunity is an improper issue in cases of
this nature. 30 Such cases might yield more practical results if the courts treated
states entering such indemnity agreements as private individuals rather than
sovereign entities. The theory of implied waiver would permit such an approach
and would eliminate the issue of immunity from cases of this kind. Although
impleader was allowed in the instant case, it was allowed only because the defendant was the United States, a party against whom immunity does not apply.
Since the United States may sue in a federal court, it may also implead a state
in a federal court. This solution would not apply, however, where a state agreed
to indemnify a private individual since the state's sovereign immunity would
shield it from an impleader action by that individual in a federal court. By
treating the state's agreement to indemnify as an implied waiver of immunity,
however, the courts could allow private individuals to implead a state in such
cases and thereby give full effect to the requirements of such agreements.
Securities Regulation-Statutory Merger Involves A "Purchase" Or
"tSale" Under Section 10 (b).-In two recent cases the Courts of Appeals for
the Second and Seventh Circuits held that a statutory merger' involves a pur29. See 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1506 (1965).
30. 64 Mich. L. Rev. 948 (1966).
1. A merger is the absorption of one corporation by another with the result that the
existence of the former ceases, while the latter survives with the addition of the merged corporation. 15 W. Fletcher, Private Corporations § 7041 (rev. ed. 1961); H. Henn, Corporations § 346 (1961). Upon merger, a shareholder of the merged corporation loses most
of his rights, such as voting for the election and removal of directors, changes in the by-laws
and charter, qualified inspection of the books and records of the corporation. H. Henn, supra
at §§ 290-330. However, certain rights are personal to the shareholder and may survive the
merger. Chief among these is the right to receive payment for shares either in cash or in
some security of the surviving corporation, as provided in the merger agreement. A dissenting
shareholder, dissatisfied with the terms of the merger, may bring a judicial action for an appraisal. This remedy is provided by most jurisdictions for dissenting shareholders of the
merged corporation. E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 910; see also H. Henn, supra at § 349 n.3.
It is well settled that merger is not within the powers of a corporation absent express
statutory grant. In effect, all mergers are statutory. McKay v. Teleprompter Corp., 17 App.
Div. 2d 299, 234 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep't 1962) ; Agoodash Achim v. Temple Beth-El, Inc., 147
Misc. 405, 263 N.Y.S. 81 (Sup. Ct. 1933); 15 W. Fletcher, supra at § 7048; 1 G. Hornstein,
Corporation Law and Practice § 362 (1959). It has been suggested that before the passage of
incorporation statutes the unanimous consent of the shareholders was required to effectuate
a merger. H. Henn, supra at § 362; Comment, The Short Merger Statute, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev.
596 (1965).
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chase and sale of securities for purposes of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and Rule lob-5 of the General Rules and Regulations Under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 3 These decisions represent the culmination
of a recent line of decisions 4 extending section 10(b) protection to merger situations after years of vacillation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.0
In the first case, a minority Class A shareholder of Crown Finance Company,
Inc. alleged that its officers and directors, in collusion with Beneficial Finance
Co., defrauded the Class A shareholders of approximately $900,000 by means of
a series of fraudulent transactions. The outstanding shares of Crown consisted of
almost 625,000 Class A shares and 46,500 Class B shares. Both classes had equal
voting power except that the Class B shareholders elected two-thirds of the directors. The fraudulent scheme was tripartite. First, Beneficial purchased the Class
B shares from the directors and officers of Crown (the principal Class B shareholders) at an excessive price. Then, Beneficial made a public offer to the Class A
shareholders in order to acquire 95 per cent of the outstanding shares. Third,
Beneficial consummated a short-form merger0 of Crown into a wholly-owned New
York subsidiary of Beneficial. The merger agreement required the surrender of
the remaining Class A shares in return for cash payments. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a cause of
action upon which relief could be granted.7 The Court of Appeals for the Second
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967).
4. Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965) involving
substantially the same factual situation as Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F2d 627 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. - (1967), also held a merger to be a sale under section 10(b) and
rule lob-5.
5. The history of the Commission position is discussed in notes 13-22 infra and accompanying text.
6. A "short-form" merger may be consummated by a resolution of the board of directors
of a parent corporation which owns a specified percentage of the outstanding shares of each
class of a subsidiary. The required percentage is set by statute and is 905 in Delaware and
959 in New York. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 253 (1967); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § g0S (Supp.
1967). Authorization is not required by the shareholders of either corporation and dissenting
shareholders may receive payment for their shares or bring suit for an apprasal where available. In a regular or statutory "long-form" merger, approval by the required fraction of
shareholders of both corporations is required (this fraction is usually two-thirds, but there
need not be the parent-subsidiary relationship). Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1967) ; N.J.
Rev. Stat. § 14:12-3 (1937); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 803 (Supp. 1967).
7. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 252 F. Supp. 212, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 374 F2d
627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. - (1967). The plaintiff's complaint alleged three
causes of action: an individual federal claim under section 10(b), a class action based on
state law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), and a federal derivative claim on behalf of Crown.
After considering the difficulties involved in bringing an action on behalf of a nonexistent
corporation the court of appeals decided that the plaintiff really did not want to bring a
derivative suit, for the benefits would accrue to the Class B shareholders-almost all of
.whom took part in the conspiracy. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 628, 637 & n.IS
(2d Cir. 1967). No decision was made with respect to whether the class action should be
allowed as the individual federal claim was reinstated. The district court had dismissed the
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Circuit reversed, holding that a short-form merger involved a sale of securities
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 which is actionable 8 by a defrauded shareholder. Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 88
S. Ct.- (1967).
In the second case, defendants, a group of directors and officers of the
Susquehanna Corporation, allegedly entered into a conspiracy with Herbert F.
Korholz, chairman of the board of American Gypsum, by the terms of which the
group sold 435,000 shares of Susquehanna to Korholz at a price $1,740,000 in
excess of their fair market value. The group then vested control of Susquehanna
in Korholz and his nominees by their seriatim resignations., Korholz in turn
transferred the shares to American Gypsum Co., which obtained a bank loan for
substantially all of the purchase price. After gaining control of both Susquehanna
and American Gypsum, Korholz secured the passage of resolutions by the
directors of the corporations recommending the merger of Gypsum into Susquehanna. The merger agreement provided for an exchange of 1.9 shares of Gypsum
for each share of Susquehanna which allegedly resulted in a gross overvaluation
of Gypsum shares. Finally, Susquehanna assumed the bank loan for the purchase
of its own shares at the inflated price. Plaintiff, a minority shareholder, brought
a derivative action 10 on behalf of Susquehanna against its directors and officers,
among others, charging a conspiracy to defraud Susquehanna in the purchase
and sale of securities in violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,11
state law claim because the federal claim was insufficient and, therefore, there was no longer
any basis for exercising "pendent jurisdiction." Id. at 637. As far as the court was concerned
the individual claim under section 10(b) was the plaintiff's primary right to relief and
afforded him a complete remedy.
8. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides the Commission with broad regulatory
and enforcement powers. Although section 10(b) does not specifically allow a person injured
by its violation to bring an action, the courts have interpreted the language of the Act to
provide a civil remedy based upon the theory that disregard of a statutory command is a
tort. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See Hooper v.
Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814
(1961); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Comment, Civil Liability Under Section 10B And Rule 10B-5: A Suggestion For Replacing The Doctrine Of
Privity, 74 Yale L.J. 658 (1965).
9. A provision in a contract for the sale of shares which calls for the seriatim resignations of the board of directors is not illegal per se, at least where the buyer is purchasing
a substantial percentage of the outstanding shares. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d
572 (2d Cir. 1962) (28.3% held substantial).
10. The derivative suit was developed in equity where a shareholder could enforce a
right on behalf of a corporation against an officer, director or other, when those in control
of the corporation refused to do so. The suit is brought on behalf of the corporation who
was the real party plaintiff. The shareholder bringing a derivative suit must have been a
shareholder at the time the suit was commenced and all during it. In addition, the majority
of jurisdictions require that he be a shareholder "at the time of the transaction of which
he complains." E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 327 (1967); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 626(b);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). See also H. Henn, supra note 1, at §§ 352-83.
11. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any
person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of
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section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction and for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could
be granted.'- The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
the issuance of securities to be exchanged for shares of another corporation pursuant to a statutory merger involves a purchase and sale of securities. Dasho v.
Susquehanrna Corporation,380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. (1967).
In 1935, the SEC, in the Note to Rule 5 of Form E-1, the form for most registrations, took the position' 3 that, for registration purposes, there was no sale to
shareholders when a statutory merger or consolidation was approved by the
vote of such shareholders.' 4 By 1943 the Commission was apparently of the view
that a merger or consolidation did not involve a sale for an), purpose, including
the anti-fraud provisions.' 5 In 1947 Form E-1 was rescinded to simplify the
registration forms,' 6 but the policy of excluding these transactions from the
registration provisions was maintained by means of administrative policy.'- This
policy was formalized once again in 1951 when the Commission adopted Rule 133
of the General Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Act of 1933.18 This
rule specifically provides that a statutory merger or consolidation shall not involve a sale for "purposes ... of section 5 of the act, [the registration provisionsi."'9 The Commission expressly provided that "[als a matter of statutory
construction the Commission does not deem the 'no sale theory' which is described
in the rule as being applicable for purposes of any of the anti-fraud provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." - Although the Commission did not expressly argue that such a transaction should be
considered a sale, this was the interpretation placed on the new rule and comtransportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the malls, directly
or indirectly-(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain
money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchaser." 15 US.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
12. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 267 F. Supp. 508, 513 (NJ). IH. 1966), rev'd, 3S0 F2d
262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. (1967).
13. For a more thorough discussion of the developments leading to the present Commission position, see Sommer, Mergers, Consolidations, Sales of Assets-Rule 133, 16 W.
Res. L. Rev. 11 (1964); Comment, Rule 133 and the No Sale Theory: Interpretation or
Legislation?, 13 J. Pub. L. 520 (1964).
14. SEC Securities Act Release No. 493(C) (Sept. 20, 1935).
15. In National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943), the Commission filed an amicus curiae brief expressing its
opinion that a consolidation did not involve a sale. Id. at 694.
16. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3211 (April 14, 1947).
17. 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 521 (2d ed. 1961); Sommer, supra note 13, at 15.
18. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3420 (Aug. 2, 1951).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1967). This is the "no sale" theory of the Commission.
20. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3420 (Aug. 2, 1951).
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mentary by at least one text writer. 21 In any event, the SEC is now
squarely in
22
favor of applying section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to these situations.
The reason for the change of position seems to stem from a realization, acquired
over years of administrative experience, that there is a great opportunity to
defraud investors by the use of corporate mergers. The need for investor protection compelled the Commission to deviate from the logical position of having a
particular transaction treated similarly for the anti-fraud and the registration
provisions. 23 The Commission attributes this dichotomy to the difficulty experi24
enced in applying the registration provisions to mergers.
Although the SEC has been criticized for this basic inconsistency, 2 the Commission's present position with respect to the anti-fraud provisions is in accord
with the intent of section 10(b). The purpose of enacting section 10(b) and
adopting rule 10b-526 was to enlarge the provisions of section 17 (a) of the 1933
Act to prohibit fraud in connection with the "sale" as well as the "purchase" of
securities.2

7

These terms are broadly defined in section 3(a) of the 1934 Act,2 8

and several transactions which do not fit the commercial definition of "purchase"
and "sale" 29 have been held to fall within section 3(a). The issuance by a corporation of its own shares has been held to involve sales under section 10(b).80
The acquisition of shares under a plan of corporate simplification, 31 the conversion of convertible debentures into common shares, 2 the conversion of preferred
21. 1 L. Loss, supra note 17, at 524.
22. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 5, Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir. 1967); Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 6-28, Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380
F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967).
23. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 20, Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262
(7th Cir. 1967).
24. Id. at 15-18.
25. 1 L. Loss, supra note 17, at 522.
26. The Commission has the power to make such rules and regulations necessary to carry
out the power granted to it by the Acts. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s, 78w (1964).
27. 380 F.2d at 266; Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461,
463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
28. Section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides: "When used in this
chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-(13) The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each
include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire. (14) The terms 'sale' and 'sell'
each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1964) [hereinafter cited as section 3(a)].
29. "'Purchase' includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien,
issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property."
N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-201 (32). "A 'sale' consists in the passing of title from the seller to the
buyer for a price . . . ." N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-106(1).
30. Rucde v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Hooper v. Mountain States
Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961) ; Kane v. Central
Am. Mining and Oil Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
31. Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
32. Hell-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831 (D.C.N.J. 1963), modified on other
grounds, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
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shares into common shares, 33 the acquisition and disposition of equity securities
in options, stock warrants and reclassifications, 34 have all been considered to be a
purchase and/or sale for purposes of section 16(b).3
Despite the SEC's struggle with the question, the problem here presented
received little judicial consideration prior to the instant cases. A similar question
was raised in National Supply Company v. Leland Stanford Junior University,38
a 1943 case involving a consolidation rather than a merger, but the decision
denied the plaintiff relief upon the equitable basis of laches and estoppel. 3- The
plaintiff had been advised of its right to dissent from the consolidation and failed
to do so within the statutory period.3 8 The court, however, agreed with the then
current position of the SEC that a consolidation was not a sale for purposes of
section 10(b). 39 In 1960 a corporation sued under section 10(b) alleging that it
had been fraudulently induced to issue shares pursuant to a plan of merger.
Denying a motion to dismiss, the court held without discussion that a merger
"'may or may not involve a purchase and sale" within section 10(b).40 More
recently, Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Company41 allowed a derivative
action involving a merger transaction to be brought under section 10(b). The
court apparently considered the merger to be a sale, but the parties did not raise
the issue and the court did not discuss it. Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco
Corporation42 is a square holding by a district court that a merger is a sale under
section 10(b). There the plaintiff was allowed to bring an individual action on
facts similar to Vine. The instant cases provide the first thorough discussion of
the problem at the appellate level.
Vine allowed the plaintiff to bring an action in his own behalf, on the theory
that he became a "forced" seller of securities when the merger was consummated
without his consent. The court found that once the merger was consummated, the
plaintiff's rights in his shares were frozen and that in order to realize any value
for them he must eventually exchange them for cash-by accepting Beneficial's
43
offer under the merger agreement or by pursuing his rights to an appraisal.
33. Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 332 U.S. 761
(1947).

34. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 516 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 507 (1967)
(dictum). Contra, Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 US. 827 (1954)
(reclassification) ; Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 US. 907 (1949)

(stock warrants).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). This section allows an action to be brought by or on
behalf of an issuer of securities to recover any profit realized from any purchase or sale of
any equity security, within six months, by a 10% owner, an officer or a director of the
issuer.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

134 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943).
Id. at 694.
Id. at 690-91.
Id. at 694.
H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).

41. 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966).
42. 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
43. 374 F.2d at 634.
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Since the allegedly fradulent merger placed the plaintiff in this inextricable position, the court dispensed with the "needless formality" of having to actually
exchange his shares in order to become a seller. 44 Although the plaintiff did not
pass "title to the buyer for a price" 45 in order to come within the technical definition of a commercial seller, 46 a sale was inevitable, and the court construed the
definition of "sale" in section 3 (a) to include this plaintiff.
Oddly enough, the district court in Dasho47 applied similar reasoning in
holding that a merger was not a sale. The court attempted to distinguish a sale
of shares from a merger by characterizing a merger as an involuntary conversion
of one type of security into another, while a sale required a volitional act.48 The
court of appeals disposed of this argument by concluding that the district court
"was unduly impressed by semantic and conceptual difficulties arising" 40 from
the application of the terms "purchase" and "sale" to mergers. Noting the broad
language of the statute, the court felt that neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court intended to restrict the definition of purchase and sale to that of the commercial law of sales5 ° and found no reason for holding that an exchange of
shares pursuant to a merger was not a sale.5 '
Reading Vine and Dasho together, it appears that section 10(b) protection is
available to all the parties who may be affected by a merger. The merger will be
deemed to involve a sale whether it requires an exchange of shares for cash (Vine)
or for shares of the other corporation (Dasho). The surviving corporation can
sue if it has been defrauded (Dasho) or its shareholders can bring a derivative
suit if those in control of the corporation are participants in the fraudulent
scheme. The shareholders of the acquired corporation will be protected whether
voluntary or forced sellers. In the case of a short form merger, all the shareholders
will be forced sellers. But even where there is a regular merger approved by the
required proportion of shareholders who exchange their shares for cash or other
consideration, the only logical extension of the present decisions would be to deem
them sellers under the statute and rule. Of course, in this situation, a court
might require that the exchange have actually taken place unless the merger
agreement was not revocable by the injured shareholders either because of insufficient voting power or otherwise.
44. Apparently the merger in Dasho had not been consummated. 380 F.2d at 266. Therefore, the Dasho court, by holding the corporation to be a seller although it had not completed the mechanics of the transaction, achieved a result analogous to Vine. However, the
court in Dasho was not overly concerned with this problem, perhaps failing to realize that
a "sale" was not inevitable, as it was in Vine, for the directors of both corporations could
still have rescinded the merger agreement before it was approved by the stockholders.
45. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-106(1).
46. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(d).
47. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 267 F. Supp. 508, 511, 514-15 (NJ). I1. 1966).
48. Id. at 511.
49. 380 F.2d at 267.
50.

Id. at 266.

51.

Id.
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The decisions in Vine and Dasho afford a reasonable remedy to defrauded
shareholders in response to increasing criticism of statutory mergers. These mergers frequently sacrifice the protection of minority interests, especially when one of
the participating corporations holds an interest in the other sufficiently large to
effectuate the merger by itself.52 Application of section 10(b) to statutory
mergers provides uniform protection for defrauded plaintiffs in contrast to the
'3
diversity of requirements for relief in different states, if a remedy exists at all.
In the case of national corporations whose shares are traded on the exchanges
and whose shareholders are found throughout the country, the policy of the
federal legislation would seem to require equal protection for all shareholders who
are defrauded in the same manner.

Torts-Contributory Negligence-More Than Apparent Peril Needed For
The Rescue Doctrine.-Plaintiff and his wife had been proceeding along a
highway when he observed that a car in front of him, driven by defendant
Martenson, was out of control. The defendant's car, collided with a parked car,
crossed the road and struck a nearby house. At that point the plaintiff,
seeing the defendant Martenson" 'slumped over the steering wheel'," remarked to
his wife that she "'must have a heart attack'.' Plaintiff immediately got out of
his own car and started to cross the road, intending to give what aid he could to
defendant Martenson. Although he noticed a car approaching, he continued
crossing the road. Having miscalculated his ability to reach the other side of the
road, plaintiff was struck by the approaching car, which was driven by defendant
Sam. The appellate division, holding that there was no basis upon which the
rescue doctrine could be applied, reversed 2 the trial court's verdict of $45,000
which had been entered against both defendants.3 The court concluded that
52. Comment, The Short Mferger Statute, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 596 (1965).
53. Comment, Civil Liability Under Section 10B and Rule 10B-5: A Suggestion for
Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 Yale L.J. 658, 670-71 &n.58 (1965).
1. Provenzo v. Sam, 27 App. Div. 2d 442, 446, 280 N.Y.S.2d 30S, 312 (4th Dep't 1967)

(dissenting opinion). The issue of the admissibility of plaintiff's statement to his wife is not
within the scope of this casenote. In New York, however, it is an area in which there is great
confusion. The statement might be admitted: (1) as part of the res gestae; compare id. at
443, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 310 (majority opinion), with id. at 448, 280 N.YS.2d at 314 (dissenting
opinion) ; (2) as a spontaneous declaration, see W. Richardson, Evidence, §§ 266-67 (9th ed.
J. Prince 1964) ; (3) as relating to plaintiff's state of mind, id. at §§ 270-71.
* 2.

27 App. Div. 2d at 445, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 311.

3. The charge of the trial judge as to the applicability of the rescue doctrine to defendant
Sam was dearly erroneous as he did not place the rescued party in peril. See note 11 infra
and accompanying text. Thus the instant court was correct in holding that it was a reversible
error to apply the doctrine against a "motorist proceeding on a highway without knowledge
that an accident has happened and that a would-be rescuer is about to run in front of the
passing'vehicle." Id. at 445, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
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"upon the elimination of the rescue doctrine from the case, a finding that
plaintiff was free from contributory negligence could not stand."4 Provenzo v.
Sam, 27 App. Div. 2d 442, 280 N.Y.S.2d 308 (4th Dep't 1967).
The courts, although rigidly adhering to the doctrine of contributory negligence, have carved out an exception that has become a rule in itself.6 This
exception affords relief to one who seeks to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained while attempting to rescue another who has been exposed to peril by the
defendant's negligence. 6 This rule places the rescuer in a favorable status as a
matter of law, if he did not act recklessly and if he did not cause the peril. 7 Thus,
one whose actions would normally constitute contributory negligence may invoke
the rescue doctrine to defeat this defense.8
The courts refuse to invoke the doctrine unless the plaintiff can establish
(1) danger, 9 either to person or property, 10 (2) caused by the defendant,
(3) creating a situation of "immediacy and urgency."" Although the rescuer's
protection does not decrease because he had time to deliberate and plan his
course3 of action, 12 he will be precluded from recovery by his rash and reckless
acts.1

The majority of courts apply the doctrine whether real or apparent peril be
4. Id. at 444, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
5. Hymes v. Pollock, 108 Cal. App. 2d 536, 238 P.2d 1056 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Devine
v. Phaelzer, 277 Ill. 255, 115 N.E. 126 (1917); Hole v. Lake, 194 Kan. 200, 398 P.2d 300
(1965); Brown v. Ross, 345 Mich. 54, 75 N.W.2d 68 (1956); Arnold v. Northern States
Power Co., 209 Minn. 551, 297 N.W. 182 (1941); Eversole v. Wabash R.R., 249 Mo. 523,
155 S.W. 419 (1913); Kelley v. Alexander, 392 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Wright v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 110 Va. 670, 66 S.E. 848 (1910); Highland v. Wilsonian Inv. Co.,
171 Wash. 34, 17 P.2d 631 (1932); Thoresen v. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 73 Wash.
99, 131 P. 645 (1913).
6. W. Prosser, Torts § 51, at 316 (3d ed. 1964); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 445
(1965).
7. W. Prosser, Torts § 51 (3d ed. 1964) ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 473 (1965).
8. W. Prosser, Torts § 50, at 297 (3d ed. 1964); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 472
(1965).
9. This element was first announced in Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 180,
133 N.E. 437 (1921), where Judge Cardozo stated "danger invites rescue."
10. See Rague v. Staten Island Coach Co., 288 N.Y. 206, 42 N.E.2d 488 (1942); Wardrop
v. Santi Moving & Express Co., 233 N.Y. 227, 135 N.E. 272 (1922); Eufemia v. Pacifico, 24
App. Div. 2d 673, 261 N.Y.S.2d 100 (3d Dep't 1965); Breslin v. State, 189 Misc. 547, 72
N.Y.S.2d 62 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
11. Luce v. Hartman, 5 App. Div. 2d 19, 22, 168 N.Y.S.2d 501, 505 (4th Dep't 1957),
rev'd on other grounds, 6 N.Y.2d 786, 159 N.E.2d 677, 188 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1959).
12. Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
13. Miller v. Union R.R., 191 N.Y. 77, 83 N.E. 583 (1908) ; Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43
N.Y. 502 (1871); Luce v. Hartman, 5 App. Div. 2d 19, 168 N.Y.S.2d 501 (4th Dep't 1957),
rev'd on other grounds, 6 N.Y.2d 786, 159 N.E.2d 677, 188 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1959). See also
Wardrop v. Santi Moving & Express Co., 233 N.Y. 227, 229, 135 N.E. 272 (1922): "Undoubtedly more risks may be taken to protect life than to protect property without involving
the imputation of negligence, but the rule is that a reasonable effort may be made even in the
latter case." Rague v. Staten Island Coach Co., 288 N.Y. 206, 210, 42 N.E.2d 488, 490 (1942).
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present.14 Thus the highest court of Washington' 5 has ruled that the rescuer is
entitled to act upon appearances even though an actual peril did not in fact
exist.' 6 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nebraska' 7 ruled that the doctrine could
be applied if the situation would "create the apprehension of danger even though
danger to a definite person or a definite property was not actually imminent at
the moment."' 8 Other courts have seemingly required proof of the existence of
actual peril.' 9 In Holle v. Lake,20 for example, where plaintiff attempted to stop
a moving truck which had been parked by the defendant on a highway, the
court stated that justification in risking one's life to rescue another can occur
only when the "peril threatening the latter ...[is] imminent and real. ..
The instant court, by stating that the doctrine may be invoked where there is a
"'reasonable basis for believing' "22 one is in imminent peril, seemingly adopted
an apparent peril test.23 From the facts it would appear that a reasonable basis
for the rescue was present. The driver had collided with a snowbank, a car and
finally a house 24 She was slumped over the steering wheel and the possibility
of the car igniting or exploding was present. Yet the court found as a matter of
law that no "reasonable person could conclude that"20 the driver was in any
"imminent or serious peril."2 7 If no reasonable person could conclude that the
driver was in imminent peril, under what circumstances could such a conclusion
be reached? The implication to be drawn from the majority opinion is that under
no circumstance short of actual peril could such a belief be provoked. Thus, the
instant court, through its application of the apparent peril test, has in fact created
and adopted a real peril test.2 8 However, to apply the apparent peril test properly,
the issue of whether the plaintiff29was justified in attempting the rescue should
have been a question for the jury.
14. Arnold v. Northern States Power Co., 209 Minn. 551, 297 N.W. 182 (1941); Ellmaker
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 372 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); Eversole v. Wabash
R.R., 249 Mo. 523, 155 S.W. 419 (1913); Wolfinger v. Shaw, 138 Neb. 229, 292 N.W. 731
(1940); Highland v. Wilsonian Inv. Co., 171 Wash. 34, 17 P.2d 631 (1932); Thoresen v.
St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 73 Wash. 99, 131 P. 645 (1913).
15. Thoresen v. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 73 Wash. 99, 131 P. 645 (1913).
16. Id. at 104, 131 P. at 647.
17. Wolfinger v. Shaw, 138 Neb. 229, 292 N.W. 731 (1940).
18. Id. at 236, 292 N.W. at 735 (citation omitted).
19. Holle v. Lake, 194 Kan. 200, 398 P.2d 300 (1965); Kelley v. .exander, 392 S.W.2d
790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Wright v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 110 Va. 670, 66 S.E. 848
(1910).
20. 194 Kan. 200, 398 P.2d 300 (1965).
21. Id. at 204-05, 398 P.2d at 304.
22. 27 App. Div. 2d at 444, 280 N.YS.2d at 310 (citation omitted).
23. Compare id. with id. at 447, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
24. Id. at 443, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 309 (dissenting opinion).
25. Id. at 446, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 312 (dissenting opinion).
26. Id. at 444, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 311 (dissenting opinion).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 447, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 313 (dissenting opinion).
29. See Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921); Carney v.
Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902 (4th Dep't 1946).
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By implicitly refusing to accept any other standard except real peril, the court
advocated a position that seemed to be more concerned with the negative task of
preventing abuse of the rescue doctrine than with encouraging rescues. Thus, the
decision is in direct opposition to the rationale of the rescue doctrine to the extent
that such a standard would mean that the rescuer would have to delay performance until he is certain that the danger is real. In many instances, this would
cause the rescuer, out of fear of liability, either to forego the attempt or to hesitate for such a long period of time that any attempt would be futile. 80 Conversely,
the one causing the peril would reap the benefits of the non-applicability of the
doctrine where no actual peril exists. Thus, the instant court has created a definite inequity by placing the rescuer in an unfavorable status unless real peril is
present.
The injustice created by the instant case could be resolved by the application
of a true apparent peril test. The generally accepted rule is that appearances
should be judged objectively by the reasonable man in the position of the
rescuer. 3 ' An appeal of the instant decision to the highest court in this state has
been filed. 32 Thus, the court of appeals will have the opportunity to clarify the

ambiguity of the application of the apparent peril test to the rescue doctrine.
30. Kelley v. Alexander, 392 S.W.2d 790, 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (dissenting opinion).
31. "The rescuer is entitled to act as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances
as they are presented to him." 27 App. Div. 2d at 447, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 313 (dissenting
opinion). See W. Prosser, Torts § 32, at 153 (3d ed. 1964).
32. Letter from Charles J. Hannum to the Fordham Law Review, July 25, 1967, on file
in the Fordham Law Review office.

